Kaisipang Hudyo sa Mga Awit 33:15: Akeidat Yitzchak & Guide for the Perplexed

From the above, it follows that being given the land of Israel and all the material wealth that this entailed, was a prerequisite for Israel to attain its spiritual objectives both nationally and individually. Cleaving to one's piece of land as a basis for one's financial security therefore, became very important. Pious people's habit of jealously guarding what is rightfully theirs, is understandable for that very reason. Also, the Torah seems especially protective about the material wealth of religious leaders. The reason is to shield them against temptation to acquire wealth by dubious means. If halachah teaches that a High Priest or prophet must be of independent means, or even be given that financial independence, this reflects the idea just discussed. It seems strange that the prophet Jeremiah is asked to waste his money by redeeming the land of an impecunious uncle, when such land is doomed to fall into the hands of foreigners. (Jeremiah 32,5-15) Although Jeremiah is not specifically commanded to purchase that piece of land to forestall it falling into the hands of his uncle's creditors, the thrust of the story is clearly that it was expected of him. Jeremiah, by his action, teaches that he carefully abided by what he perceived to be the will of G'd, even if there was room to doubt the matter. Also, Jeremiah was prepared to spend any amount of money to fulfil G'ds will, since he was certain that G'd would not want him to waste his money. Having done what he perceived to be G'ds will, he asked for some illumination. This was because he wanted to be certain that what he had done did indeed correspond to G'ds wishes. G'd told him that he had indeed interpreted His will correctly, that the money was not wasted however, since the eventual return to Zion was just as certain as the destruction which was about to happen. (verses 37-44)

3) It is on the third plane, man's relationship with society at large, that man's duty to act morally is most evident. Concerning all his business dealings, man needs to observe justice and fairness, as well as to ensure that no fellow human being suffers physical harm on his account. When David dispatched a servant to Naval, (Samuel I 25,6) bidding him "may you be at peace, may your household be at peace, may all that is yours be at peace," he may well have referred to the three areas in which man has to assure himself of his moral well being. "Peace is only attained when one has satisfied the moral demands made upon one." When Michah identifies the Lord's demands on mankind, (Michah 6,5) he refers to the very same thing when he proclaims "what does the Lord demand of you except to do justice, loving kindness and to walk humbly with your G-d." Justice refers to one's conduct vis a vis society at large, loving kindness to one's conduct vis a vis one's family who may not have a legal claim on one. Finally, humility is an area in which one is least restricted, namely one's conduct vis a vis oneself. When Moses describes G-d’s attributes, (Deut. 32,4) he refers to the same thing. "All His ways are justice," refers to G-d’s conduct in His very own domain. "A G-d of faithfulness," refers to His relationship with His creatures. "He is righteous and upright," refers to His relationship with the universe at large. Psalms 145,17, "G-d is just in all His ways, fair in all His deeds," explains that there are two kinds of justice. Tzedek is the justice that applies to most men in similar circumstances. Chessed is the allowance made for special circumstances when the law, which is after all designed to cover only most situations, fails to allow for special circumstances. The right to grant pardon is based on the recognition that strict application of the law does not always mean that true justice is being meted out. G-d, of course, is the ultimate judge who can make allowances for all exceptions, since He is the only one aware of all circumstances. Tzaddik, just means the norm are His guidelines. Chassid, He adjusts for individual need. Here are some examples of the inadequacies of normal assumptions which Jewish law is based on. "Debtors do not repay loans before the due date." (Baba Batra 5) The underlying assumption of this statement may not always be correct. "Claimants have to furnish proof of their claim." G-d has instructed Jewish judges in Deut. 17,10, that if doubts arise as to the adequacy of existing provisions in law, the Supreme Court may give a decision based on their deliberations, and such decision is binding, even (as the Sifrey puts it) if "they say that left is right or right is left." The idea is: even if the decision of the Supreme Court appears in direct conflict with normative Jewish practice. Of course, all this is applicable only when the Supreme Court's decision is based on accepted Jewish guidelines. Anyone who disputes the authority of such a Jewish Supreme Court, i.e. Sanhedrin, is liable to the death penalty. The Talmud Shabbat 10, states "whosoever judges truly, is a partner to G-d." This is also the reason that Torah frequently refers to judges by the term "elohim." This is also what the serpent had in mind when it said to Eve "you will be like elohim, knowing good and evil." (Genesis 3,5) The Midrash explains the meaning as "like creators of worlds." He who invariably feels himself bound to the general rules, even though he may be meticulous in applying them, is destroying worlds rather than building them. The Talmud Baba Metzia 38, claims that it was this kind of bureaucratic zeal that caused the destruction of Jerusalem.

If the task of the Messiah is to teach people to lay aside their swords etc., then it is clear that when natural law rules, harmony will be restored to the world. Torah embodies this natural law, and this is the reason Abraham could divine it without having it revealed to him. Matan Torah, the gift of the Torah, was only the revelation of a law which had existed since before man had been created; in fact, it had been the blueprint with the help of which G-d created the universe. On occasion, clever people, such as the daughters of Tzelofchod, sensed this, though even Moses was not clear about it. (Numbers 27). Jacob, according to Pessachim 119, felt unqualified to preside over the saying of grace because he had married two sisters, alive at the same time, though at the time this had not yet been prohibited. He faulted himself for not having divined the will of G-d at that time. All of this is true in spite of the fact that the social legislation of the Torah contains apparently arbitrary ordinances. An example is the replacement value of thirty shekalim for a gentile slave regardless of his age, health etc. Similar apparent discrepancies we find in the sums allowed a father whose daughter has been raped etc. The law addresses itself to normal situations, since indirect damages are not assessed against the culprit. Any exceptional cases come under the heading of damages caused indirectly. Where wilful damage is discussed, such as in the case of the slaughtering of stolen animals, and penalties of four or five times the value of the animal in question, the Talmud goes to some length to demonstrate the natural law involved in such Torah legislation. (Baba Kama 68) The thrust of the legislation is to enable those who study it to develop the character traits that make the provision for non observance merely academic, since students of the Torah would not dream of allowing themselves to be guilty of transgressing these laws. Our sages taught that the universe is based on and can survive only by means of "justice, truth and harmony." (Avot 1) This means that a) a system of justice must be legislated and administered. b) Since this legislation parallels natural law, it is based on truth. c) Since such a system of law must be willingly embraced by the people to whom it is addressed, it promotes peace and harmony. In order to be absolute truth, Torah law must reconcile the true interests of the individual with the true interests of the society he lives in. To that end, legal decisions are left to Courts of Torah experts, scholars, not lay jurors. However, just as being an expert in anatomy does not yet make a person a doctor,-unless one has complete understanding of the interaction of all parts of the anatomy,- so knowledge of Torah precepts without comprehension of how to apply them when conflicting interests are involved, does not qualify a Torah scholar to act as judge. The Talmud Sanhedrin 7, is on record that in the event untutored judges are part of the Court, the former must be assisted by experts. Jewish social legislation, when practiced by Jews, has a greater influence on refining the character of the people practicing it, than the laws of any other religion. Benefits that accrue through such observence are twofold. 1) Social, i.e. application of such laws as the appointment of kings, will ensure the smooth functioning of society. 2) Benefits to the individual both during and after life. The eykev rav, great reward that David describes in Psalm 19, 13, as a reward for observing these laws, applies beyond the pale. This is also the answer of the Torah to the question of the wise son regarding the purpose of Torah legislation in Deut.6,20. "It shall be righteousness unto us" (verse 25) This is the reason the Torah says of this legislation "place it in front of them," i.e. not in front of the gentiles. Even if the latter were to adopt our legislation as their own, he who chooses non Jewish judges to settle his problems does not only not perform a commandment thereby, but commits a transgression. Just as the slaughtering of a ritually pure animal by a non Jewish slaughterer renders such an animal unfit for consumption by Jews, neveylah, although the act had been identical to that performed by a Jew, G-d is on record as saying "He did not do so for any gentile; and Jewish legislation, they do not know them." (Psalms 147,20